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MODERN STATUTORY APPROACHES TO
SERVICE OF PROCESS OUTSIDE THE STATECOMPARING THE NORTH CAROLINA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH THE UNIFORM
INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL
PROCEDURE ACTt
MARTIN B.

Louis*

INTRODUCTION

In 1967 North Carolina adopted a version of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) I and a comprehensive long-arm statute.2
Consequently, the legislature repealed most of the state's jurisdictional
statutes including the nonresident motorist act,' which provided, like most
of its counterparts, 4 for registered mail service upon those subject to its
terms. Under the new procedures,' all nonresident defendants were to be
served by the personal delivery of process outside the state or, failing this,
by publication and mailing.6 The greater expense of serving nonresident
motorists in this manner understandably upset many attorneys, and they
eventually prevailed upon the North Carolina General Statutes Commission, the sponsor of these new statutes, to revive the nonresident
motorist act, or at least the registered mail provisions thereof.' As a memt This article was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
N.C.R. Civ. P. 1-84, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (1969). Unlike the FRCP and
most other state versions thereof, the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
(NCRCP) were enacted directly by the legislature.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1969). This statute was based upon the Wisconsin
long-arm statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1970).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-105 to -107 (1953), repealed by Ch. 954, § 4, [1967]
N.C. Sess. L. 1353.
'See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); 2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 4.41-[2] (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]; Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d
1033 (1964).
'Service of process is governed primarily by NCRCP 4.
' This scheme was also based upon the provisions of the Wisconsin statute.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970).
The NCRCP, though adopted by the General Assembly during the 1967
session, were originally scheduled to become effective on July 1, 1969. Ch. 954,
§ 10, [1967] N.C. Sess. L. 1354. The interim period was to be used, inter alia, in
studying the new statutes and making necessary corrections and changes before their
effective date. All recommendations were channeled to the North Carolina General
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committee,3

ber of the Commission's drafting
I was assigned to the task
initially. I soon came to the view that all nonresident defendants, and not
just motorists, should be subject to service by registered mail. With the
acquiesence of my colleagues and the Commission, I undertook to draft
such provisions, which, I had assumed, could be found in various existing
long-arm statutes. To my surprise, I discovered that almost none contained
such provisions, that few satisfactory models were available, and that I
would probably have to create or borrow piecemeal much of the necessary
language. Nevertheless, the draft was eventually completed, approved
with minor changes by the Commission, and enacted in 1969 as an amendment to rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (NCRCP).9
In the course of preparing the provisions and incorporating them into
the statutory scheme, I faced more choices and constitutional questions
than I would have thought possible in such a limited task. In the belief
that other states will seek to enact similar provisions in the near future, I
have attempted to set down here a discussion of these questions and problems and the reasons that guided my eventual choices. I shall also contrast
the North Carolina provisions with those of other jurisdictions, most
notably section 2.01 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure
Act (IIPA), which was, together with rule 4(e) of the Arizona Rules
of Civil Pocedure, my principal point of reference. I hope the discussion
will be helpful to attorneys who must use the new North Carolina provisions and to the courts that must eventually construe them.
THE CONCEPTUAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

Early American courts often stated that judicial process could not run
from one state to another.10 This maxim expressed their belief that the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident required the presence of his
person or property within the territory. In 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff,"
this territorial view of jurisdiction became the standard of due process
and consequently a constitutional restriction upon the range of state
judicial process. This restriction might have become increasingly unfair
Statutes Commission, which was preparing an omnibus amending act that was
adopted in 1969. As part of that amending act, the effective date of the rules was
postponed until January 1, 1970. Ch. 895, § 21, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1033.
'The committee consisted of three professors of law-one each from Duke
University, the University of North Carolina, and Wake Forest University.
Ch. 895, §§ 1-4, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1026-29. This was part of the omnibus
amending
See note 7 supra.
10See, act.
e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'Id.
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to the states and their citizens as interstate business and travel burgeoned
thereafter; but the courts employed fictions of presence and consent to
circumvent it and extend the jurisdictional grasp of the states.' 2 Finally,
3
in 1945 in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court
rejected the territorial view as the measure of due process and held that
a nonresident defendant could be summoned to a jurisdiction whenever
his activities there reasonably justified requiring his presence. It followed
that whenever such an appropriate basis for personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident was asserted, process could openly run to him beyond the
boundaries of the state so long as the mode of the delivery employed was
reasonably calculated to give him notice of the pendency of the action.' 4
This change in conceptual reasoning made possible two related statutory reforms. The first, now implemented in many states, involved the
enactment of modem long-arm statutes requiring a person to appear anywhere his acts give rise to the claim asserted against him. The second,
which is still unimplemented in most states and is the subject of this
article, involved the adoption of provisions allowing the use of any
convenient and reliable method of giving notice to a nonresident defendant
of the pendency of an action. The failure of so many states to enact
modem service provisions cannot be attributed to any doubts as to the
constitutionality of such "substituted" or special service of process. Any
such doubts were buried long ago under a score of approving decisions.' 5
Whether the failure to implement this reform has been due to inertia,
indecision as to how far to go, or a fear of the dark corners at the
extremities of the law is unclear. In any event there appears to be a
gathering momentum that may complete this second reform within the
decade.
12For a general review of these developments, see Kurland, The Supreie Court,
The Dute Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From
Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cxi. L. REv. 569 (1958).
'2 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1,Id. at 320. The same bifurcated approach had earlier been employed in cases
upholding substituted service of process upon state citizens absent from the jurisdiction. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Walker, Foreign Corporation
Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C.L. REv. 1, 25 (1968).
" E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (registered

mail); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 650-51 (1950) (registered
mail to serve individual and corporation); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945) (personal service upon agent within the state and registered mail outside state); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957)
(service by personal delivery outside state); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) (registered mail).
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SELECTING THE MODES OF SPECIAL 16 SERVICE OF PROCESS

There are three basic methods of serving process outside the statepersonal delivery, mail requiring a signed receipt, and publication with
notification by ordinary mail (hereinafter referred to as publication and
mailing) .17 The IIPA also allows service as directed by the court or in the
manner prescribed by the law of the place where it will be made,1 8 but these
options essentially provide only new means of access to these three basic
methods.
Personal delivery would undoubtedly be included today in any general
scheme of service outside the state because it is familiar, reliable and
effective.19 But because personal delievery is expensive and sometimes
ineffective, its supplementation through service by mail requiring a signed
receipt or by publication and mailing must be considered. Mail requiring
a signed receipt is economical and reliable"0 and has long been successfully
22
21
employed in serving foreign corporations and nonresident motorists.

Now that its usage is no longer limited to those classes of defendants from
which the state may exact a fictitious consent to the appointment of a local
agent, 23 the only consideration is its efficacy in giving notice of the
pendency of an action. And, since it has been satisfactory for notifying nonresident motorists, it should also be satisfactory for notifying any other
nonresident tort-feasor or, for that matter, any other nonresident defendant over whose person the court may validly acquire jurisdiction.
"Special" service includes all types of service other than personal delivery
within the state. The word "special" is used to denominate these types of service because the more familiar words are inaccurate. Thus, "substituted" or "constructive"
service is inaccurate because "special" service includes service by personal delivery
outside the state. And viewing "special" service as solely service outside the state
is also inaccurate because "special" service includes the use of registered mail and
publication within the state.
1' Except where the context clearly suggests otherwise, the use of the word
"publication" alone as descriptive of a mode of service includes notification to
the defendant, whenever possible, by ordinary mail.
18

8

UNIFoRM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 2.01 (a).

" Id. at § 2.01, Commissioners' Note.
" Mail requiring a receipt signed by the addressee may actually be more reliable
than personal delivery since forgery of the signature, being more easily detectable
than a false return, will presumably be less frequently essayed. Where the signed
receipt may be signed by persons other than the addressee, its reliability goes down,
of course, just as it does for personal delivery in jurisdictions permitting process
to be left with persons other than the party to be served. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
4(d) (1). There is also some reason to fear that registered mail service in foreign
countries is not as reliable as it is domestically.
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-146(a) (1969) (originally enacted in 1955).
'8 See note 4 supra.
Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1953).
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Unlike mail requiring a signed receipt, publication is not "a reliable
means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are
before the courts."2 4 Consequently, the constitutionality of its use has
often been questioned,25 and its inclusion within any general scheme of
substituted service must be approached with caution. Since Pennoyer v.
Neff,20 its use in in personam proceedings has largely been forbidden,
but its wide use in in rem type proceedings has often been to the exclusion
of other, more reliable, modes of services. These seeming antinomies,
which were largely caused by the territorial notion of jurisdiction, 7 have
now diminished along with the notion itself. Thus, presently in in rem
type cases, publication without mailing is ordinarily not sufficient to notify
persons interested in such proceedings.28 And in cases in which jurisdiction is asserted to be in personam, a combination of publication and
mailing is being increasingly used to give actual or acceptable constructive
notice to persons who apparently cannot otherwise be notified.29 Indeed,
such persons may be the only ones today who may properly be notified
by publication, even when the proceedings are in rem or quasi in rem.
But for the previously mentioned historical distinction and the number of
potentially invalid statutes involved, the Supreme Court perhaps should
so hold.30 But the prime concern of this article with publication is its use
2

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
d.
2095 U.S. 741 (1877).
5

"Jurisdiction over the person of a nonconsenting nonresident could only be
based upon his presence within the jurisdiction. Personal service of process upon
him within the territory was, therefore, the only way to serve him. Even if he
"'consented" to jurisdiction in advance, he was to be notified pursuant to service
upon a local agent since process could not run outside the state. Similarly, notice
to persons whose property had been attached or garnished or was the subject of the
proceeding was given constructively by publication within the state.
"0Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane V. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950). The decisions in these cases do not point out whether registered mail or personal delivery, rather than ordinary mail, will be required to
satisfy due process when defendants are few and their addresses are known.
2

E.g., Dobkin v. Chapman (Sellars v. Raye), 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451,

289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968); Wis. STAT. A-N. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970); Note, Civil
Procedure-Constitutionalityof Constrictive Service of Process on Missing Defe7dants, 48 N.C.L. Rnv. 616 (1970).
"0If a diligent effort to give notice by personal delivery or registered mail is
required by the due process clause in in personam proceedings, it should also be
required in in rem type proceedings unless some difference between the two proceedings dictates a different result. The only possible difference is that'the seizure
of property when an action is begun in an in rem type case may itself come to the
attention of'the defendant or his ageiits in whose custody he may have left the
property. See note 33 infra. But often the defendant will not receive timely actual
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to achieve jurisdiction in personam; and, therefore, the discussion will
hereafter be primarily so confined.
To give notice satisfying the requirements of due process, "the means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."' The appropriate means to
inform a known defendant is undoubtedly personal delivery or mail
requiring a signed receipt. But is constructive notice appropriate when
the defendant cannot be found or, for some other reason, cannot be served?
For example, suppose that a motorist gives the injured person a false
address or moves without leaving a forwarding address and cannot
be found. He may, of course, be validly served by publication if his
property 2 is first attached or garnished, even though neither the newspaper
notice nor the seizure of his property" comes to his attention. It is his
own fault he cannot be informed, and public policy favors immediate
compensation to the plaintiff through execution upon the previously seized
property after judgment by default has been entered.84 Should not these
same considerations authorize the use of publication in in personam
actions involving missing or absconding defendants ?" The two are not
very different because there is present in each an appropriate basis for
jurisdiction and the same gesture of notice. In an in personam proceeding
there will of course be one basic proceeding in the jurisdiction where the
accident occurred, rather than one or more anywhere the property of
defendant is found. But relieving the plaintiff of the possible inconvenience
notice in this manner, and, in addition, there is no way for the court to know of
this fact before judgment by default is entered. Thus, modern service of process
provisions often provide that defendants in in rem or quasi in rem actions must be

served in the same way as in in personam actions. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970).
8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).

'2 New York now holds that a defendant's insurance policy is a chose in action
subject to garnishment. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Contra, State ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v.
Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Howard v. Allen, - S.C. -, 176
S.E.2d 127 (1970).
" The fact that people usually leave their property in the care or custody of another, who would inform them of a judicial seizure, is regularly used to justfy the use
of publication in in rem type cases. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). That the
custodian does not know where defendant is does not, however, invalidate the
service.
"Cf. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950).
"'Cf. Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161

(1968).
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or hardship of the in rem type proceeding is hardly a denial of due process
to the defendant.
Another difference between in personam and in rem type proceedings
as to the possible use of publication arises from the possibilty that the
holder of an in personam default judgment entered on such service may
never locate property of the defendant upon which to execute. The same
possibility cannot arise, of course, if the plaintiff is compelled to proceed
in rem because such a proceeding requires the seizure of property at the
time the action is begun. In view of this difference, busy courts, being
obviously reluctant to do a vain act, should arguably permit the use of
constructive notice by publication only for in rem type proceedings. But
such proceedings may have to be duplicated if sufficiently valuable property cannot be located in a single state. Furthermore, an in personam
judgment can often reach a missing defendant's insurance company or a
public agency prepared to compensate the victims of uninsured motorists.8 6
Finally, even though the plaintiff is unable to obtain immediate pecuniary
satisfaction on his default judgment, he will at least be spared the necessity
of litigating a stale claim whenever the defendant or his property is located.
For all these reasons, an increasing number of cases sanction the use of
publication to give notice to missing defendants in in personam actions.31
Even when defendant's address or whereabouts is known, he sometimes cannot be served by ordinary means because he has intentionally
evaded the process server or refused to accept or call for a registered
letter."' In this situation can there be any constitutional objection to
service by publication and mailing? Delivery of the letter, the use of
which has been compelled by defendant's own misconduct, is highly probable. Furthermore, the alternative is unnecessarily costly surveillance by
8

Id.

Dobkin v. Chapman, 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161

(1968); Cradduck v. Financial Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 850, 52 Cal. Rptr. 90
(Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Harrison v. Hanvey, 265 N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965).

Dicta supporting these decisions are found in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) and Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S.
112, 115 (1956). Arizona has by judicial construction unfortunately limited the
publication provisions of Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (3) to in rem type cases. O'Leary
v. Superior Court of Gila County, 104 Ariz. 308,452 P.2d 101 (1969). See generally
Note, 48 N.C.L. Rav., supra note 29.
"' Many cases hold that a returned, unclaimed registered letter does not meet the
requirements of a nonresident motorist act requiring a signed receipt. Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 1033, 1045 (1964). They do not, however, say that the plaintiff may not
thereafter resort to publication and mailing or any other form of constructive

notice.
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dprivate process server or perhaps no service at all. And although the
expense involved in employing a private process server would presumably
be chargeable to the defendant as costs if the plaintiff ultimately prevailed,
it does not follow that the plaintiff should be compelled to incur these
expenses since there is no guarantee that the defendant will ever be found.
However, an unopened door or an unclaimed registered letter does not
always indicate a missing or skulking defendant. He may simply be away
from home for an extended period. This common situation raises a swarm
of difficult questions over the use of service by publication. Must the plaintiff use diligence to find and serve the defendant elsewhere by ordinary
means before he may resort to publication? How extensive or costly must
the inquiry or search be? If it appears that the defendant is traveling and
cannot be readily located 'but will return in a period of weeks or months,
must the plaintiff await his return? Is a default judgment based on
service by publication and mailing void or voidable if the plaintiff fails
to exercise due diligence in any of these regards? Should the defendant
who honestly absents himself from the jurisdiction for a long time but unreasonably fails to provide a forwarding address or other means of contact
be constitutionally amenable to service by publication ?39 If so, should
the judgment be set aside under.rule 60(b) (1) or equivalent provisions
if he shows upon his return a meritorious defense to plaintiff's claim ?40
Questions like these inspire the nightmare in which a person returns
home to find that his house and effects have been seized by others pursuant
to execution upon a'default judgment. Does this possibility or those
questions that inspired it justify or require the rejection of publication
as a service device of last resort? Arguably, it does
not. The defendant
is not seriously injured before his property is sold. The burden of
opening the judgment would be imposed upon him, but that burden may
not be great if he is an innocent and wronged as the question supposes.
He must hire a lawyer, of course, but that necessity arose when plaintiff
first decided to sue him.
But what if his property is sold at auction before his return? Obviously this will not happen frequently because most defendants will learn of the
peril before the substantial passage of time required by statute from the
*'In answering this question affirmatively in the case of a missing defendant
not shown to be hiding intentionally, one writer has stated: "The careless as well
as the scoundrel owe equal responsibility to answer for their obligations." Note,
Service by Publicationon a Defendant Who Cannot be Located in California, 3
U. SAN FRmANCiSCO L. REv. 320, 326 (1969).
,0Note, 48 N.C.L. Rav., supra note 29, at 623.
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filing of the complaint to the sale at execution. Furthermore, property
that is subject to execution is also subject to attachment or garnishment,
and the use of published notice plus mailing has never been (though
arguably it should be) found to be insufficient in in rem type cases. In any
event, although restitution in kind may not be possible, financial restitution
can be assured by requiring an execution bond. 41 The danger can be
further reduced by requiring prior judicial approval of all default judgments obtained through service by publication.' The court could then
refuse to enter the judgment if it were not convinced that the defendant
was missing or hiding or had negligently concealed his whereabouts.
Alternatively, it could defer entry of judgment until the plaintiff took
additional steps to locate the defendant or give him notice.43
The plaintiff should, of course, know of these possibilities and voluntarily delay or forswear the use of publication if it places his judgment
under a cloud. The cost of a necessary execution bond may itself give him
pause. But he would presumably prefer the right to assume the risk and
cost when necessary than to have no chance for service when defendant is
really hiding or missing. Thus, service by publication can, when properly
supervised, provide justice for deserving plaintiffs who otherwise would
have no recourse, and it rarely causes injustice or inconvenience to innocent defendants. Consequently, no effort was made to restrict or eliminate
its use in the North Carolina provisions.
Those who wish to urge their jurisdiction to use registered mail or
publication and mailing as modes of process service may choose to make
the legislative debating point, regardless of how insular or parochial it may
otherwise be, that the benefit of such provisions inures to local citizens,
whereas the harm or inconvenience falls principally upon nonresidents.
Such sentiments, when carried too far, may lead to due process challenges
or refusals to accord comity or full faith and credit. But what has been
suggested herein apparently offends none of these principles of fairness, at
N.C.R. Civ. P. 55(c).
"E.g.,
12 If
the plaintiff's claim is not for a sum certain, he must apply to the court
for a default judgment. N.C.1L Civ. P. 55(b) (2). But if it is for a sum certain, the

application must be to the clerk. N.C.R. Cirv. P. 55(b) (1). The court must still
approve the execution bond before the entry of the default judgment. N.C.R. Cirv.
P. 55(c). In this way the court should have an adequate opportunity to scrutinize
all judgments by default entered upon service by publication.
"

The IIPA does not allow publication except upon court order. UNiFORm
§ 2.01(a). Consequently, the

INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr
court may protect the defendant as it sees fit.
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least when measured by the United States Constitution. Consequently, it
may not be inappropriate in selling the use of such devices to note whose
ox is gored in their rejection.
PRIORITIEs AmONG THE MODES OF SERVICE

Some service of process provisions purport to leave the choice of mode
to the absolute discretion of the party making service.44 Others condition
the availability of some modes on the nonavailability of others.4 ' The latter
approach offers guidance in the choice of mode, but in the process it
creates statutory prerequisites the existence of which the plaintiff may be
required to establish, sometimes in a collateral attack at a time and place
inconveniently distant from their occurrence. Choosing between personal
delivery and mail requiring a signed receipt on the basis of these considera40
tions is not difficult. Neither is so much more unreliable than the other
that its availability must be limited or conditioned in order to meet the
requirements of due process. Both offer advantages and disadvantages that
are not easily summarized in statutory language and that are, therefore,
best left to a statutory comment or other published material. Consequently
the choice between them should be left to the party making service. Most
statutes so provide.41
The nonavailability of the more reliable modes of service is generally
a prerequisite to the constitutionality of the use of publication4 s and would,
therefore, have to be established when the latter is challenged, regardless
of what the publication provisions themselves require. 40 Thus, nothing
is saved if these provisions do not so condition the use of publication, except
the effort of draftsmanship; and the best way to warn of constitutional
dangers is lost. For this reason, including such conditions in the statutory
requirements is an appealing option. 0 In any event, an accompanying
statutory comment explaining these constitutional requirements in detail
"H. SmIT, REPORT ON WHETHER TO ADOPT IN NEW Yoax, IN WHOLE, OR IN
PART, THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT 145, reprinted fron, REPORT OF THE ADMINIsTRATIvE BOARD OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE STATE oF NEw YORK FOR THE JUDICIAL YEAR JULY 1, 1966 THROUGH
JUNE 30, 1967.
"E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j).
" See note 20 supra.

"'E.g., ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9); UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE

ACT § 2.01 (a).

See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
"Cases cited note 28 supra.
oE.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970).
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should be prepared. 51 Furthermore, the courts will hopefully function as
a backstop to the attorney's judgment whenever the use of publication or
the granting of default judgments is judicially supervised.
North Carolina now permits the use of personal delivery and registered
mail interchangeably and without restriction.5 2 And NCRCP 4(j) (9) (c)
permits service by publication and mailing whenever the "address, whereabouts, dwelling house or usual place of abode" of the party to be served
"is unknown and cannot with due diligence be ascertained or there has
been a diligent but unsuccessful attempt to serve the party under either
paragraph a [personal delivery] or under paragraph b [registered mail]
or under paragraphs a and b of this subsection (9)." The first part of
the immediately preceding language provides in effect that when the party
to be served is missing and cannot be located, a formal but useless effort at
service by registered mail or personal delivery at some last known address
or place currently known to be incorrect is not a prerequisite to the use of
service by publication and mailing. Obviously, such a charade could not
satisfy the requirement of diligence under the statute or due process under
the fourteenth amendment.5 3 To satisfy either, there must be a diligent,
but unsuccessful, effort to locate the missing defendant.5 Consequently,
if his disappearance is first discovered in the course of a formal attempt
to make service, efforts to ascertain his correct address or whereabouts
55
should still be made.
The second part of NCRCP 4(j) (9) (c)-allowing the use of publication and mailing whenever there has been a diligent, but unsuccessful,
effort to serve defendant by personal delivery or registered mail or bothis properly invoked only when the defendant's correct address or whereAniz. R. Civ.
8nE.g.,
2N.C.R.
Civ. P. 4(j)
88Cf. Schroeder

P. 4(e) (1), State Bar Committee Note.
(9) (a)-(b).
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) ; Walker v. City of

Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).

"Grigsby v. Wopschall, 25 S.D. 564, 570, 127 N.W. 605, 607 (1910); Note,

48 N.C.L. REv., supra note 29.
85 At first glance, this possibility seems to be governed by the second part of rule

4(j) (9) (c), which would lead to the same result if the failure to look for the
defendant after the unsuccessful attempt to serve him did not satisfy the "diligence" requirement thereof. Such a result would also seem to be required by the

sense of the first part of rule 4(j) (9) (c) and the due process standard it codifies.
Indeed, the "diligence" requirement of the second part must incorporate the requirements of the first part to avoid constitutional difficulties. Thus, it is correct to say,
though the text of paragraph (c) does not clearly so indicate, that the second
part of the pargraph is invoked only when attempts to serve defendant have failed,
even though his correct address or whereabouts is apparently known.
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abouts is known but attempts to serve him personally have failed."0 Since
his correct address is known, he should actually learn of the pendency of
the action from the notice sent to him by ordinary mail in accordance with
the rule's requirements. Consequently, there is no need to exhaust completely the possibilities of serving him through the other modes. For
example, if the defendant evades a process server or refuses a registered
letter, he has received all the "diligence" he is owed and may then at
plaintiff's option be served immediately by publication and mailing.
Suppose, however, that the registered-mail letter is returned unclaimed
or efforts at personal delivery fail because the defendant is away from
home. Here a diligent effort may require the plaintiff to locate and serve
the defendant elsewhere or await his forthcoming return home. And if
the plaintiff does not know from the first unsuccessful effort at service
whether the defendant is "lying low" or is simply away from home, he
must make a diligent effort to learn which of these alternatives is the
case and then proceed accordingly.
A party not away from home who receives timely actual notice
through service by publication and mailing to his home may still appear
and challenge service if he was denied due "diligence." But if he appears
without objection or does not appear and allows judgment by default to
be entered against him, he waives the error. NCRCP 12(h) (1) and
4(j) (9) (e) 5 7 specifically so provide. However, if the defendant was
away from home and did not receive timely actual notice, which through
due diligence could have been given him elsewhere or later when he returned, the default judgment is presumably void and subject to direct",
or collateral attack. 9
In short, publication is permitted whenever the defendant cannot with
due diligence be served by personal delivery or registered mail. This
terse statement might just as well have been the statutory language. It
would not have made much difference substantively, and it would have
avoided difficulties that may lurk within the more complicated language
actually used in the new rules in an attempt to guide the bench and bar in
'

See note 55 supra.

Mere errors in service of process which do not deny the defendant actual
notice generally cannot support an attack. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ;
RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 8, Comment b (1942); 46 Am. JUR. 2d Judgments
§ 659 (1969). See the further discussion of this point in the text following note 121
infra.
asE.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (4); N.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (4).
"IF. JAMES, Civrt PRocEDuRE § 11.6 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 8.11 (1942).
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the use of publication."0 Thus, it may be better to require "diligence"
in the statute as a constitutional warning that the requirements of due
process must be met, but to leave the definition of "diligence" entirely
to the courts. More sophisticated warnings, guidance, or definition can
still be placed in a statutory comment.
Another approach is found in the IIPA. It purports to allow all modes
of service to be used interchangeably and without restriction. But it does
not explicitly mention publication, which is presumably available if
"directed by the court" under section 2.01(5).61 Such judicial direction
allows the greatest flexibility in dealing with the kinds of situations for
which service by publication is an appropriate last resort. Furthermore,
it automatically provides a mechanism for guiding the plaintiff and protecting the defendant. Consequently, it may give the use of publication
greater prestige in the eyes of a foreign court asked to enforce a resulting
default judgment. But the plaintiff may not need the court's advice or
warrant its scrutiny; and if the defendant appears, he can protect himself,
Thus, mandatory judicial intervention at the beginning of the litigation,
rather than at the end when a default judgment is sought, may produce
unnecessary delay, waste precious judicial time, and constitute an overcautious statutory overkill. Furthermore, any resulting default judgmen
is still ex parte and subject to attack on due process grounds even though
it bears the imprimatur of the rendering court.
Actually, there appears to be no clearly preferable choice between the
two approaches. The choice for NCRCP 4(j) (9) was in effect predetermined by the provisions existing when the amended rules were
drafted. Those provisions conditioned the availability of publication on
the nonavailability of personal delivery 2 and virtually demanded the same
approach in the case of registered mail.
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A PERSON IS SUBJECT TO THE
SPECIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS PROVISIONS

The Constitution merely requires a mode of service reasonably calculated to give actual notice. Thus, a state could give the plaintiff a free
choice between registered mail or personal delivery within or without
:0See note 55 supra.
81
Presumably it can also be used under § 2.01 (2) of the IIPA if "prescribed
by the law of the place in which service is made."
62 These provisions were derived from Wis. STAT. A NN. § 262.06 (Supp. 1970),
which is still so conditioned.
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the state in a single statutory section. But most states apparently are not
ready to authorize the unconditioned use of registered mail within the
state.' Consequently, it is much simpler to draft special provisions covering those persons who cannot be served by personal delivery within the
state.
Such a bifurcated approach, however, expresses of necessity a statutory
preference for service within the state by personal delivery; and a defendant served outside the state may complain that he has been denied such
service. The denial is not of constitutional dimensions, of course. Consequently, the North Carolina special service provisions require only a
diligent effort to effect service by personal delivery within the state."4
What actually constitutes diligence in the discharge of this duty is unclear.
It should vary with the likelihood that the party to be served can actually
be found within the state."5 In any event, an asserted lack of due "diligence" that results only in service of process outside the state perhaps
need not be scrutinized as sedulously as when it results in constructive
service and a denial of actual notice.
To minimize even further the effect of this preference for service
within the state by personal delivery, such provisions can contain a list
of categories of persons who are denied it and can be served immediately
in any manner consistent with due process. The persons listed should be
those not ordinarily amenable to service by personal delivery within the
state. The North Carolina list, which is longer than most, 6 includes any
party
that is not an inhabitant of or found within this State, or is concealing his person or whereabouts to avoid service of process, or is a
transient person, or one whose residence is unknown, or is a corporation
incorporated under the laws of any other state or foreign country and
" California and Illinois permit service by certified or registered mail within
the state in small claims actions. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 117c (West Supp. 1970);
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110A, § 284 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (certified mail only). Presumably small claims defendants are also entitled to service satisfying the notice
requirements of the due process clause.
"The special service provisions contained in NCRCP 4 (j) (9) become operative
whenever a party "cannot after due diligence be served within this State in the
manner heretofore prescribed [personal delivery] . ..."
" If plaintiff reasonably believes at the time service is made that defendant is not
within the state, he should not be required to establish this fact to a certainty.
But, if plaintiff knows that a nonresident is, or recently has been, temporarily present
within the state, he must serve him accordingly or establish that he has departed.
" Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) with Anz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1).
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has no agent authorized by appointment or by law(1 to be served or to
accept service of process ....

68

The foregoing list, as well as the basic definition of those subject
to the special service provisions-i.e., all those persons within the court's
jurisdiction 9 who cannot after due diligence be served by personal
delivery within the state1 -- intentionally covers some persons who ordinarily would be served personally within the state. An obvious illustration
is a resident temporarily absent from the state. Since he is not "found
within this State,"'" he may be served immediately outside the state by
personal delivery or registered mail, even though he might also be served
within the state by leaving the papers at his dwelling house with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. 2 Furthermore,
if process could not be left at his residence with a proper person, he might
then also be a person who cannot after due diligence be served within the
state.
A more interesting case arises when the sheriff is unable to serve a
party supposedly residing or present within the state. The party may be
17 Because of the unrepealed service provisions of the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-143, -144 (1965), this language contains
a possible trap for the unwary attorney. The language was obviously not intended to
include a foreign corporation that has obtained a certificate of authority to do business and has thereby consented to service of process under North Carolina General
Statutes section 55-143. But it was intended to cover any non-registered foreign
corporation. Unfortunately for this intention, North Carolina General Statutes
section 55-144 provides that the Secretary of State shall be an agent for service
upon any such corporation on a cause of action arising out of the transaction
of business within the state. Consequently, the corporation has, in the words of
NCRCP 4(j) (9), "an agent authorized . . . by law to be served or to accept
service of process" and arguably must be served under the Business Corporation
Act. This would mean that a foreign corporation could never be served under rule
4(j) (9) unless the long-arm provisions of North Carolina General Statutes section
1-75.4 are "longer" than the definition of "transacting business" found in section
55-131 of the Business Corporation Act. Even worse, the mention of foreign
corporations in rule 4(j) (9) might deceive the plaintiff into thinking that those
corporations could sometimes be served thereunder. Obviously section 55-144
should be repealed immediately or rule 4(j) (9) should be amended to express its
original purpose of including all foreign corporations lacking a certificate of
authority to do business within the state.
" N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (footnote added).
" The basic requirement, which is expressed in NCRCP 4(j), serves as a
reminder that whenever the sole basis of jurisdiction over a defendant is his presence
within the state, he can only be served by personal delivery within the state.
"0N.C. Civ. P. 4(j) (9).
7

L1
Id.

" N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (1) (a).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

"concealing his person or whereabouts to avoid service of process."" He
may also be someone who cannot after due diligence be served within
the state. In either case, an attempt to serve him by registered mail
within the state may then be made7 4 Furthermore, if he refuses to accept
or pick up the registered letter and this refusal satisfies, as it should, the
statutory requirement of "diligence," he may then be served by publication
and mailing at his last known address within the state.
These provisions make it possible to serve local deadbeats and others
of that stripe without resorting to the costly services of private process
servers75 or requiring proof that the party has concealed himself or left
the state to avoid service of process. 6
Unlike the North Carolina provisions, the IIPA unfortunately may not
now perform this useful function. Article I, which contains the long-arm
provisions, is entitled "Basis of Personal Jurisdiction over Persons Outside This State." And Article II, section 2.01, which contains the "special" service provisions, is invoked "when the law of this state authorizes
service outside this state." This language may persuade a court that
section 2.01 does not permit service within the state, even though it would
permit service upon the same person if he stepped outside the state. Such
a result, though perhaps illogical, is not tragic if the provisions governing
service within the state permit substituted service on such persons. But
FRCP 4 does not contain such alternatives. Consequently, combining
it with the IIPA may leave an unintended gap in the provisions.
Needless to say, the gap is easily closed. Persons subject to service
of process outside the state under Article I of the IIPA are obviously also
amenable to special service within the state.77 Consequently, it is necessary only that sections 2.01(a) (3) and 2.01(a) (5), authorizing substituted service by mail requiring a signed receipt or as directed by
the court, also be available for use within the state. Since this result
is not now specifically precluded by the language of those sections, it
7

N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b). This paragraph makes no mention whatsover
of service outside the state. Thus, it would clearly be available for service within
the state under these circumstances. But see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2), which limits
'

the use of registered mail to addresses outside the state.
cKelway, Profiles-Placeand Leave with, NEW YORKER, Aug. 24, 1935, at
23-26, reprinted in part in J. COUND, J. FKIEDENTIIAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 143-45 (1968).
"0E.g., Robbins v. Bowman, 9 N.C. App. 416, 176 S.E.2d 346 (1970).
""See note 69 supra.
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may be assured perhaps by nothing more than a statutory note to that
effect, some changes in the title of Article I, and a slight redraft of the
introductory language of section 2.01.
JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF SPECIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS

There is no absolute need for judicial supervision of special service
of process since the defendant may challenge its inadequacy by appearance
or by attack upon a resulting default judgment. Judicial supervision may
nevertheless have much to commend it, especially when publication is the
mode of service involved. Thus, it may prevent default judgments based
on an improper use of such service and, thereby, avoid a resulting execution for which the plaintiff possibly cannot later make restitution, and it
can at least require security in case restitution is eventually ordered. It
can also bring about additional efforts by the plaintiff to give the defendant actual notice or to demonstrate the necessity for constructive notice.
Finally, it may, by compelling diligent efforts to give the defendant actual
notice, give service a judicial imprimatur that may be persuasive to
other jurisdictions asked to honor a resulting default judgment.
The foregoing reasons should incline most jurisdictions to some degree
of supervision. However, when registered mail or personal delivery is the
mode employed, no supervision seems to be necessary prior to the time
that a default judgment is sought. Either is reasonably calculated to give
the defendant actual notice. Consequently, he will probably appear without
objecting to the service, thus rendering any prior supervisory requirements
mere rigmarole.7" Furthermore, he is fully competent to assert any failure
to use due diligence to serve him by personal delivery within the state. If
there is a default, the application for judgment will, of course, require proof
that service was effected.7" NCRCP 4(j) (9) also requires a contemporaneous filing of an affidavit of service showing the circumstances warranting the use of special service. This requirement provides the court
with its only opportunity to enforce the legislative preference for service
within the state by personal delivery, the denial of which cannot thereafter
support an attack on the requested default judgment.8 " Filing the affidavit
"'ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (a) requires the filing of proof of service of process
by registered mail immediately after service is effected. Aside from creating a
judicial record of the fact and date of service before entry of default-which record
serves no apparent purpose-it seems to serve only the tradition that an officer file
his return of service directly with the courts as soon as it has been effected.
SN.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (a)-(b).
Defendant has been given actual notice by personal delivery outside the state
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with the required proof of service requires no extra steps, of course. Nor
is its preparation particularly burdensome. In fact, affidavits would be
required anyway as part of the proof of service when registered mail or
publication is the mode employed."'
Waiting until the application for default judgment will arguably
also suffice when publication is the mode employed, though some would,
as already indicated, require judicial permission even to use it. 2 The
affidavit showing the circumstances warranting the use of publication is
important because it must establish, by showing the plaintiff's diligent
but unsuccessful efforts to give the defendant actual notice, the constitutional unavailability of the other modes. And though it succeeds in establishing the plaintiff's "diligence," it may persuade the court that additional
efforts, such as publication elsewhere or notice to the defendant's insurance
company or others,8 should be essayed before judgment by default is
entered.
Under NCRCP 4(j) (9) (c) the affidavits required in connection
with publication and mailing are to be filed when service is completed and
not with the application for default judgment. This requirement may serve
a useful purpose in in rem type proceedings involving many defendants 4
and thereby justify its presence in a single publication provision applicable
to both in rem and in personam proceedings. In most actions based on the
special service provisions, however, it serves no apparent purpose; and,
or by registered mail anywhere. Since these modes are as reliable, at least when
used within the United States, as personal delivery within the state, their availability

could be made unconditional. Consequently, any failure of plaintiff to use due

diligence in making service by personal delivery within the state would seem to be
mere error and not suitable grounds to attack a judgment. See note 57 supra. Rule
4(j) (9) (e) so provides.
81 N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b)-(c).
2
" UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT § 2.01 (5). See
text accompanying notes 61 & 62 supra.
"Note, 48 N.C.L. REv., supra note 29, at 625 nn.47 & 48.
"In actions involving numerous defendants, some of whom may be unknown, the
failure of some defendants served by publication and mailing to appear will not
produce an immediate default judgment since others representing their interests may
appear. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
In such cases, it makes sense to file the affidavits required by rule 4(j) (9) (c) immediately after the publication and mailing are completed, because otherwise, years
later when the litigation terminates in a decision on the merits, the existence of the
default as to the nonappearing defendants and those filing requirements may be
overlooked. Although the same situation could arise when defendants are served
personally or by registered mail, it is less likely. Furthermore, in that situation
nothing would prevent the plaintiff from filing proof of service before entry of
final judgment was sought.
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therefore, delay in filing the affidavits, which does no apparent harm,85
should not be penalized, especially since the practice is different when
other modes of special service are employed.
Under Federal and North Carolina Rule 55 (b) (1), a default judgment
may be entered by the clerk of court regardless of the mode of service
employed when plaintiff's claim is "for a sum certain or for a sum which
can by compilation be made certain." Because of the constitutional
problems involved, the clerk may not be the right person to scrutinize the
use of service by publication. Consequently, its use should in some way
divest him of jurisdiction to enter a judgment by default or at least also
involve the court. The latter is effectively accomplished by NCRCP
55 (c), which provides that if service is based on publication, no default
judgment shall be entered until the plaintiff shall have filed a bond approved
by the court, which presumably may then also approve or disapprove the
underlying service.
THE MECHANICS OF USING MAIL REQUIRING A SIGNED RECEIPT

Both registered and certified mail provide for, but do not require, the
use of a return receipt. 86 Both can provide that only the addressee may
sign the receipt and receive the letter.8 7 But registered mail, which costs
fifty cents more than certified mail, is handled more carefully and is slightly
less likely to go astray. Does this sole difference justify the exclusion of
certified mail service, which is not available outside the country, from the
delivery of process domestically? It should not. Proof of service of
process by either method would require presentation of the signed receipt
or other evidence satisfactory to the court of delivery to the addressee.
But if the letter were lost en route, neither delivery nor proof thereof could
be made, and defendant could not be harmed or inconvenienced. Consequently, it is for plaintiff, who may be inconvenienced by the loss, and
not for the Constitution or the legislature, to decide whether to eschew
the potentially false economy of service by certified mail. The IIPA so
concludes and requires only "any form of mail .. . requiring a signed

,5Defendant has forty days to answer or otherwise plead after the first publication of notice. N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (c). Filing the affidavits of service and
publication at the beginning or the end of the forty day period seems to make no
difference,
so long as they are filed before the entry of default.
88
The post office charges fifteen cents extra for the signed receipt.
7This provision, which costs fifty cents extra, is indicated by the legend
"addressee only" on the envelope.
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receipt."" 8 Arizona8 9 and North Carolina,"0 however, and nonresident
motorist acts91 allows only registered mail to be used. There is no apparent
reason for this restriction today other than the fear that those not familiar
with the unimportant differences between the two services might oppose
a statute that also authorized the general use of certified mail service.
Since such sentiment has not been prevalent in North Carolina, any future
amendments to these provisions should authorize the use of either registered or certified mail.
In the past, nonresident motorist statutes and other acts permitting
service by registered mail usually required the plaintiff to deliver a copy
of the summons and complaint to a public official for dispatch to the defendant by registered mail, return receipt requested. The delivery to the
public offlical, who was supposedly the agent of the defendant, constituted
service within the state as required by the territorial view of jurisdiction.9 2
Such delivery is no longer required, of course, and the plaintiff may now
be authorized to mail the letter directly to the defendant." Under this
procedure, however, an unscrupulous plaintiff could mail the defendant
papers other than copies of the summons and complaint in order to mislead
him into defaulting, a scheme that delivery to a public official would prevent. But a default judgment cannot be obtained without swearing "that
a copy of the summons and complaint was deposited in the post office for
mailing by registered mail, return receipt requested." 9 4 I doubt that plaintiff or his attorney would commit perjury in this way for so dubious an
advantage. One can, of course, imagine horror stories involving the duped
secretary who mailed the letter without actually seeing its contents and
who is later induced to sign the affidavit. But is the prevention of so unlikely an event really worth the cost, delay, and bother of regularly involving public officials, especially when a judgment based on such a fraud
"UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 2.01(a); see
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-339 (1962) (registered or certified mail to serve certain

nonresident defendants). Certified mail, return receipt requested, is also allowed

for service in small claims actions in California and Illinois. CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE

§ 117c (West Supp. 1970); 110A ILL.
1968).
Aiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (a).

STAT. ANN.

ch. ll0A, § 284 (Smith-Hurd

'8N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b).

8'Annot, 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1035 (1964).
'2 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); 3 MooRE,

4.41-[2]:
SOlberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 34041 (1953).
9'N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b).
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can always be opened? The IIPA,'k" North Carolina,9 and Arizona9 7 do
not think so and permit the party making service to dispatch the letter
9s
himself. For making service in a foreign country, however, FRCP and
the similar provisions of Arizona9 9 and North Carolina1Y0 require that
the letter be dispatched by the clerk of the court. One may concede, of
course, that extra caution and judicial involvement are more desirable in
the case of service in a foreign country without concluding that this extra
step is necessary for service within the country.
When the addressee of a registered or certified letter is not at home,
the postman may allow other individuals found on the premises and
authorized to receive the addressee's mail 0 1 to sign for it. Although the
signer must be of suitable age and apparent discretion, he apparently need
not then be residing at the defendant's address, as is often required in the
case of service of process by personal delivery, 10 2 and apparently could be
a maid, baby sitter, friend, or relative. Thus, there is some risk that
defendant will not actually receive the letter or learn of its contents. To
avoid this possibility, the statute could require that the receipt be signed
by the addressee, a requirement that would virtually compel the use of
"addressee only" service whenever the defendant was a natural person.
The IIPA and rules derived therefrom for service in a foreign country
specifically so require.10 3 On the other hand, the basic Arizona and North
Carolina provisions 0 4 for service within this country, 0 5 as well as most
UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROcEDURE Acr

°T0N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b).
O AIz.R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (a).

§ 2.01 (a) (3).

""FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (1) (D).
"Aiz.R. Civ. P. 4(e) (6) (a) (iv).
100 N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (d).
10
' The fiction of agency, which had been adopted by the post office, is one often
employed by the courts in accepting a receipt signed by another as proof of service
by registered mail. Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1050 (1964). The agency is, however, assumed from the relationship between the addressee and the person signing,
rather than proved.
(1); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (1) (a).
"'E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)
AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 2.01 (b) ; FED.
.0.UNIFORM INTERSTATE

R. Civ. P. 4(i) (2); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (6) (b). But see N.C.R. Civ. P.

4(j) (9) (d), which does not require the signature of the addressee for service in

a foreign country. Because foreign mail service is apparently often less reliable,
this aberration in the North Carolina version should be regarded as an oversight
hopefully to be changed at the first opportunity.

...
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (a); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (b).

...By contrast, the small claims service provision of California and Illinois

require, like the IIPA, that the receipt be signed by the addressee. See note 88

.S"Pra.
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nonresident motorist acts,""8 contain no such specific requirement.
In interpreting nonresident motorist acts, courts have often accepted
receipts signed by persons "authorized to receive the addressee's mail."' 0 7
And although there are some contrary decisions, 1 8 none have suggested
that a statute authorizing the acceptance of signatures other than the
addressee's would be unconstitutional. Indeed, such a holding seems
unlikely in view of the apparent constitutionality of provisions authorizing
the leaving of process with persons other than the defendant.'
And in
0
the absence of substantial difficulty with these provisions," how can much
greater caution in the use of registered mail be justified? The fact that
the post office may deliver the letter to persons not "then residing therein"
admittedly lowers the reliability of the signed receipt by a hair; but the
difference does not appear to be of constitutional dimensions. And if it
were, the gap could simply be closed"' without reverting to the unnecessary
caution of an "addressee only" requirement. But there is really no cause
for concern with the present provisions. The person who signs will probably be a spouse or parent or someone trustworthy enough not only to be
allowed on the premises by the defendant, but also to deliver the letter
or notice of it to him. In any event, the courts have shown a readiness
11 2
to protect defendants who have moved or did not receive actual notice.
Finally if a letter requiring the addressee's signature is returned "unclaimed"-which will undoubtedly happen more frequently with an addressee only" requirement-this may constitute, if the defendant is not
away from home, the "diligent but unsuccessful effort" that permits resort
under NCRCP 4(j) (9) (c) to service by publication and mailing. Thus,
we may be rejecting a reliable signature in favor of none at all and denigrating the usefulness of registered mail in favor of publication rather
than personal delivery. For these reasons, it is preferable not to require
the addressee's signature for service within the country and to leave the
.0.Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1050 (1964).

2071d.
1 d. at 1052.

108

1 9

° E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (1) (9).
1102 MooaE, 4.11.
...
Although the statute could condition the validity of such service on delivery
to someone "then residing therein," there is no direct way of requiring the post office
to adopt this requirement. Nevertheless, most persons authorized to receive the
addressee's mail probably meet this requirement anyway. Consequently, the service
would be valid in most cases. Plaintiff might have to check, of course, to see whether
the signature on the receipt meets this requirement, an inconvenience that might
drive him to "addressee only" service.
"'12Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1052 (1964).
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acceptability of another's to the judgment of the courts and the plaintiff,
who may in doubtful or important cases seek the greater security of personal delivery or "addressee only" registered mail service originally or in
a second effort as a backstop. This judgment admittedly does not follow
what appears to be the current statutory trend. But the trend is, I suspect,
more responsive to apprehended political necessity than to the Constitution, consistency and sound public policy.
An undelivered registered mail letter will be returned to the sender
bearing a stamped self-explanatory legend affixed by the post office. These
legends include the following: refused, unclaimed, moved and left no
address, no such street or number, and unknown. All of these indicate that
the letter was not delivered, which is ordinarily a prerequisite"s to proof
of service of process. The first, and sometimes the second, legend may
permit plaintiff to resort immediately to publication and mailing under
NCRCP 4(j) (9) (c); the last three would seem to require a diligent
effort to ascertain defendant's correct address or whereabouts.
When the addressee or other person authorized to receive his mail
refuses to sign for a registered letter, it will be returned stamped "refused."
Some would contend that the envelope containing this legend should, like
a signed receipt, constitute proof of service of process by registered mail
since the addressee has notice or is personally responsible for his lack of
it." 4 As appealing as this position seems, it was rejected in NCRCP
4(j) (9) (b) for the following reasons. First, unless the addressee himself
refused to sign, which cannot be known unless the letter was sent "addressee only," he would be penalized for the refusal of persons over whom
he may lack control. Secondly, the correctness of the legend depends
entirely upon the postman's honesty and identification of the person who
refused to sign." 3 Thirdly, the defendant's refusal to sign does not prove
113
The nonresident motorist acts of some states will apparently accept, as proof
of service, plaintiff's affidavit that the letter was mailed or delivered to the proper
public official for mailing, and courts have approved such service. 2 MOORE 4.411[2]; Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1037 (1964). Whether such service would be
approved today is unclear, since the statutes do not require that defendants actual
whereabouts be unknown and undiscoverable with due diligence. Nor do they
necessarily provide the appropriate safeguards surrounding this final gesture of
service as North Carolina does in supervising service by publication and mailing.
114
Annot., 95 A.L.R.Zd 1033, 1048 (1964).
This argument alone is admittedly unpersuasive since the same infirmity
attends service by personal delivery. Indeed, the problem may be worse there since
process servers, who may have to make special trips to a defendant's door until
service is effected, clearly have more incentive to feign service than do postmen,
who return regularly to a defendant's door, to feign delivery of registered letters.
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he knew that he was being sued or that a particular plaintiff was suing him
for a particular reason in a particular court. Indeed, the defendant may
have believed the contents of the envelope to be entirely different from
what they were and may have refused to sign for reasons having little to
do with the desire to avoid a lawsuit. Consequently, it appears better that
the plaintiff be forced to resort to publication and ordinary mailing than
that the "refused" letter itself constitute service. The defendant cannot
refuse this second letter, which will give him actual notice, and presumably
will be charged with the added cost of service by publication if he loses.
Under NCRCP 4(j) (9) (b), service is complete on the day the letter
is delivered, as disclosed on the return receipt. The same result obtains
if service is made by personal delivery, even though the papers are left
with someone other than the defendant, and there is no reason to add, in
the case of service by registered mail, extra days before the period to
answer or otherwise plead begins to run."( However, the rule provides,
in the language of the now repealed North Carolina nonresident motorist
act, that the court shall, upon motion of the party served, allow such additional time as may be necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend the action. Presumably plaintiff's attorney will ordinarily
consent to such an extension anyway and obviate the necessity of bothering
the court. 117
ATTACKING JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT

Service schemes embodying a preference for personal delivery within
the state and authorizing the use of publication must of necessity create
three sequential levels of availability, each separated from the next by the
Such is the case with NCRCP 4(j),
requirement of due "diligence." '
delivery within the state, registered
personal
are
the three levels of which
mail and personal delivery outside the state, and publication. A defendant
may, of course, appear prior to judgment and successfully complain of
any denial of due "diligence." But can he also attack a resulting default
judgment? Common sense would preclude an attack if a defendant merely
receives actual notice from service on the second level instead of the first
and allow it, as due process would seem to require, if he receives only
"1" But see Aalz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) (a), which-along with other jurisdictions
-does add extra days in this instance.
11 N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(b).
118A fourth level could exist if a process server had to use diligence to serve
defendant personally before he could leave the papers with other persons at defendant's residence. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 262.06(1) (Supp. 1970).
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constructive notice by publication when through diligence he could have
been located and given actual notice. 119 Arguably, it should not matter
that the missing defendant fortuitously learns of the pendency of the
action. The initial likelihood that he would not learn is so great that an
attack should still be allowed to encourage the plaintiff to exercise diligence in locating him.1 0
Suppose, however, that the defendant is served by publication and
mailing to a correct address. If he were away from home at that time
and were denied timely actual notice because the plaintiff failed to exercise
diligence in locating him elsewhere, the judgment is clearly void. But if
he received actual notice at home from service by publication and mailing,
the judgment should not be void simply because service by personal delivery or registered mail was also possible. The denial of due "diligence"
here is not of constitutional dimensions because the method of service
was reasonably calculated to give actual notice and in fact succeeded. But
the defendant can argue as a matter of policy that registered mail and
personal delivery are superior and should be forcibly encouraged, not
because they alone can give actual notice, but because they alone permit
immediate verification of its receipt. One is inclined to reject this argument because the defendant can appear before the entry of default and
challenge service on this ground. But so can a missing defendant who
learns fortuitously of service by publication, and it was previously suggested that he need not appear. It is difficult to distinguish between the
two situations, as is evident if we assume the defendant was away from
home legitimately and also learned of the pendency of the action fortuitously. The dilemma can be resolved in a practical manner by distinguishing
between defendants who are at home and those who are not. The former
are likely to receive actual notice from the mailing and would probably
be guilty of contributory fault if the initial service by personal delivery
or registered mail was unsuccessful. The latter are not likely to receive
actual notice and probably are not guilty of contributory fault if their
whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable. Thus, in the former situation
the exercise of due "diligence" should not be regarded as a condition
12
precedent to the validity of service; in the latter, it should. '
...
Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). If
the missing defendant could not have been located and actually notified, he has
received the only service possible under the circumstances. Thus, even though a
search for him was never commenced, the default judgment should not be void.
Cf. Wuchter v. Pizutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
Such a deficiency
l" RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 8, Comment b (1942).
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Most states would probably reach the same results under general common law principles of judgments-' or the conflict of laws,123 which are
summarized in the Restatement of Judgments as follows:
Where a method of service of process is provided for by a statute
of the State, but there is a failure to comply with the requirements
of the statute as to the method of service, a judgment will be void or
merely reversible, depending upon whether there has been a failure to
comply with a requirement which is a condition precedent to the
exercise of jurisdiction. .

. In construing statutes providing for

methods of service of process upon the defendant, the present tendency
is to hold that failure to comply strictly with the requirements of the
statute does not make the judgment void if the failure does not deprive
the defendant of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Where, however, a statute is not fully complied with, with the result that there is
substantially less likelihood that the defendant will receive notice, the
judgment may be void even though the notice actually given would have
24
been sufficient if the statute had so provided.1
Paragraph (e) of North Carolina Rule 4(j) (9) codifies these principles
in their effect upon the due "diligence" requirements as follows:
No party served under this subsection (9) may attack any judgment by default entered on such service on the ground that service,
as required -by this section (j), should or could have been effected,
with or without due diligence, under some other subsection of this
section (j) or under a different paragraph of this subsection (9).
The codification was intended to make it clear that "due diligence"
was not a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction if, despite
its denial, there resulted service reasonably calculated to give defendant
actual notice. Unfortunately the articulation of this purpose is perhaps
lacking. Thus, one reader has wondered whether paragraph (e) seeks
to preclude even an attack of constitutional dimensions when the lack
of due "diligence" results in service by publication. 26 Obviously, it
cannot bar such an attack and does not seek to do so, as the words "as
renders the judgment void and subject to collateral attack. Id. at §§ 8, 11. See
the text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
'"See note 58 supra.
...
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 429, comment g (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92(d) (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
" RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

"EM. ROSENBERG, J.
334 (1970).

§ 8, comment b (1942).
H. SMIT, ELEMENTS

WEISTBIN &
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required by this section (j)" were intended to signify.'2 6 Furthermore,
paragraph (e) could be read to bar even a direct attack under rule
60(b) 7 when "diligence" is lacking and, as a result, the registered
letter is signed for by another and the defendant never receives notice
or when "diligence" is lacking and the mailing that accompanied publication has gone astray. Again this was not the purpose of the paragraph.
The gist of paragraph (e) is that an attack will not be allowed simply
because due diligence was not accorded. But where this failure unexpectedly also results in a denial of actual notice, a direct attack should certainly
be possible and paragraph (e) should not be viewed as seeking to bar it.
1" The problem here is that the statutory and constitutional requirements of due
"diligence" coalesce in the case of a missing defendant and that language waiving
the former would seem to intend to waive the later. The phrase "as required by
this section (j)" sought to limit the waiver to the former only.
...
Note, 48 N.C.L. Rnv., supra note 29, at 623.

